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'This number of *LCM*' is the first for some time that has been in the hands of subscribers close to the month of which it bears the name, and hopefully means that *LCM* is back on course. The month is important also for Classics at Liverpool, since the Department of Latin, which last year continued to exist alongside the new Department of Classics and Archaeology, ceased to do so on the 30th September when the resignation of Professor Cairns from the Chair of Latin took effect.

Professor Cairns has been appointed Professor of Latin Language and Literature in the School of Classics of the University of Leeds, and Mr S. Ryle has also taken up an appointment in the School of Classics there. At the same time Dr Kennedy has taken up an appointment in the Department of Classics and Archaeology at Bristol University. The Department of Latin at Liverpool is now subsumed in the new Department of Classics and Archaeology here at Liverpool, into which the Departments of Greek and Ancient History and Classical Archaeology were subsumed last year.


The Department of Classics and Archaeology offers four degrees, one in Classics, one in Classical Studies, one in the Archaeology of the Eastern Mediterranean and one in History and Archaeology: in Classics, students may specialize in the area of their choice and the full range of Honours courses is offered in Latin, Greek, Ancient History, Art and Archaeology; in Classical Studies one language is taken from scratch for three years in addition to other courses & both may be.

Thus the first stage of the agreed policy for Classics of the Academic Committee of the University has now been completed.

It will also be helpful for readers in this country to have a list of the members of the Department, together with their new telephone numbers which should be dialled now that the University's new telephone system has come into operation. The University's number, 051-794-2000, will operate a stacking system and it may take time for calls there to be answered.

The members are, then, Dr H.J. Blumenthal, Head of Department, 794-2437, Professor J.K. Davies, 794-2400, Mrs P.A. Sweetingham, Secretary, 794-2438, Mrs J. Perry, Secretary, 794-2441, Dr W. Barr, 794-2453, Dr G. Clark, 794-2443, Dr H.A. Forbes, 794-2450, Mr J.C.B. Foster, 794-2452, Mrs N. Fox, 794-2449, Mr D.J. Freke, 794-2442, Dr L.R. Laing, 794-2447, Dr C.B. Mee, 794-2445, Mr D.F. Petch, 794-2451, Dr J. Pinsent, 794-2448, Mr R.J. Seager, 794-2439, Dr C.J. Tuplin, 794-2446. Dr Barr retires at the end of this session and Dr Pinsent at the end of the next. Readers are asked to make these new numbers known to colleagues and to their Department Offices.

After which necessary duty undertaken for the University the Editor resumes his Editorial hat, to comment on one of the articles of this number. Readers will know that he frequently browses in

odd volumes, and very recently when clearing some shelves he found an old volume of *Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine* for January - June 1841, which contained, in the number for January, an anonymous article on 'The Speeches in Thucydides' which seemed to him peculiarly apposite for a number of reasons, quite apart from its intrinsic merit. 'Maga', as it was affectionately known, was in no sense a professional journal, and it is sufficiently remarkable that such an article appeared in it at all. In *LCM* today it makes an interesting pendant both to that of C.A.Stray in the May number and to the Editor's notes in that of June, and a foretaste of the proposed Colloquium on 19th Century Classical Scholarship in English. It may, indeed, be that the authorship is known to some readers, and if so the Editor would be glad to have it. He reprints it in the double columns in which it appeared, with the original pagination indicated and the notes in the form in which they appeared. He was particularly struck by the fact that the Greek dispensed with accents and smooth breathings, though whether this was simply a typographical convenience of the magazine he does not know. At all events, he hopes that it may prove of as much interest and edification to readers as it did to , or rather, since he has acquired a new *lōgo* (not, as he so often hears, *lōgo*),



P. J. Bicknell (Monash): *Ephialtes' death in bed*

LCM 13.8 (Oct.1988), 114-115

Photius (*Bibliotheca* 151a) cites Ptolemaeus Chennus, who flourished around A.D. 100, to the following effect: *τελευτήσαντος Δημητρίου τοῦ Σκηψίου τὸ βιβλίον Τέλλιδος πρὸς τῇ κεφαλῇ αὐτοῦ εὑρέθη· τὰς δὲ Κολυμβώσας Ἀλκμάνους πρὸς τῇ κεφαλῇ Τυρονίχου τοῦ Χαλκιδέως εὑρέθη· φασι, τοὺς δ' Ὑβριστοδίκας Εὐπόλιδος πρὸς τῇ Ἐφιάλτου, τοὺς δὲ Εὐνίδας Κρατίνου πρὸς τῇ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων, τὰ δ' Ἔργα καὶ τὰς ἡμέρας Ἡσιόδου πρὸς τῇ τοῦ Σελεύκου τοῦ Νικάτορος κεφαλῇ.*

In the wake of a 19th century critique by R. Hercher (*JbP. für Kl. Philol.* Suppl. Bd. I [1855-6], 2690-93) scholars have been more than cautious about placing credit in Ptolemaeus' superficially impressive erudition. As René Henry succinctly puts it (Photius iii, Budé 1962, 51a n.1): *'l'auteur ne cite le plus souvent comme garants que des auteurs inconnus ou des ouvrages inconnus qu'il attribue à des écrivains connus'*. Some of the purported data furnished above are typically disconcerting. Tellis is otherwise unknown and so too Tyronichus of Chalcis. A *Hybristodikai* by Eupolis is elsewhere unattested. On the other hand, apparently unimpeachable fragments survive of a *Eunidai* by Cratinus (fr. 65-70 Kock). Was Ptolemaeus nothing but a brazen fraud or had he simply a penchant for the recondite?

Seemingly presented in our passage is a list of individuals who passed away with a congenial book beside them. We know that Alexander the Great died in his bed (cf. e.g. Arr. 7.25-6, Plut. *Alex.* 76) and it is not totally inconceivable that the *Eumenidai* of Cratinus, of which the theme is regrettably inscrutable, furnished his final reading matter. Seleucus son of Nicator was assassinated by Ptolemy Keraunos, but our sources (Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F8; App. *Syr.* 62; Strabo 13.4.1 [623C]; Paus. 1.16.2, 10.19.7; Plut. *Mor.* 555b-c [*de sera num. vind.* 10]; Plin. *NH.* 6.31; Justin 17.2.4; Oros. 3.23.63) are short of details concerning the precise circumstances and for all we know he may have lingered on for some days before being struck down. We have no information concerning the demise of Demetrius of Scepsis. Tyronichus, to repeat, is otherwise unknown. There remains Ephialtes.

The obvious identification is with the Athenian political reformer who, according to the *Athenaion Politeia* (25.2) brought a series of suits against prestigious members of the Areopagus Council prior to contriving the removal from that body of various powers that it exercised. Were Ptolemaeus a more confidence-inspiring authority it would be tempting to proceed to draw support from the catalogue for David Stockton's recent inference (*CQ* ns32 [1982], 227-8), on the basis of more familiar evidence (*AthPol.* 25.4; Diod. 11.77.8; Antiphon 5.68), that Ephialtes' unexpected and

mysterious death took place in his home, perhaps in his bedroom.

An arguably decisive counter-indication is the alleged author of the work supposedly discovered by the reformer's corpse. Ephialtes died in the archon-year of Canon, 462/1 (*AthPol.* 25.2 & 4). Eupolis first exhibited, on the natural deduction from an anonymous work on comedy (Anon. π. κμ. 10, p.7 Kaibel), in that of Apollodorus, 430/29. If the *Suda* is to be trusted (s. v. Εὐπολῖς) Eupolis was only 17 years old on that occasion. Plainly the reformer was never in a position to read a play by Eupolis. But then a *Hybristodikai* is not in evidence among the fairly extensive wreckage of Eupolis' works. The possibility ought at least to be allowed for that, correctly apprised about the finding of a comedy of that name by Ephialtes' body, Ptolemaeus contributed the name of an author he considered appropriate. The result was a glaring anachronism. The true authorship of the *Hybristodika*, if it existed, is beyond recovery. Candidates, however, are assuredly available, such as Magnes, who wrote 11 comedies (Anon. π. κμ. 5, p.7 Kaibel) and exhibited one of them in the archon year of Menon, 472/2 (*IG* II².2318.6-9).

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R. W. Sharples (University College London): *Condemned out of his own mouth: two notes on Callicles in Plato's Gorgias* LCM 13.8 (Oct. 1988), 115–116

Of all Plato's works, it is in the *Gorgias* that the clash of two sets of incompatible moral principles and attitudes to life is most clearly displayed. The *Gorgias* is also a carefully composed work full of echoes both of words and ideas. Given the care with which the dialogue is composed, it does not seem unreasonable to pay close attention to the words in which Plato makes Callicles express his position.

I

To Socrates' question whether the strong man will exercise self-control (491d ff.) Callicles replies that a man cannot be happy if he is enslaved (*δουλεύων*) to anything (491e6); the conventional law of the many, advocating self-restraint, is a 'master' (*δεσπότης*) that the strong should not impose upon themselves (492b7). Callicles has already in his Great Speech praised actions that are 'liberal' (*ἐλευθέρος*, *ἐλευθέριος*) or worthy of a free man (485b4, c5, e1); and 'freedom' or 'liberality' is a key theme of the dialogue. 'Freedom' is what rhetoric achieves for its practitioners according to Gorgias (452d6), though the pseudo-art of cosmetics, which is to the body what sophistry is to the soul, is 'illiberal' according to Socrates (465b4). (Cf. T. Irwin, *Plato's Gorgias*, Oxford 1979, p.192.)

Callicles goes on to say that happiness lies rather in having the greatest possible desires, providing one is able to 'service' them (*ὑπηρετεῖν*, 492a1). It is true that not all *ὑπηρεταί* were necessarily *δούλοι* but many surely were (at *Politicus* 289c4 Plato couples '*δούλοι* and all *ὑπηρεταί*'). And in *Republic* 9 571a ff. Plato portrays the state of the man whose soul is like a city ruled by a tyrant, being enslaved to one overriding and consuming passion and full of *δουλεία* and *ἀνελευθερία* (577d2, 4). One should be cautious about reading material in later dialogues back into earlier ones; but earlier works may contain the germ of ideas developed later. In *Gorgias* 491e–492a at least it does not seem too far-fetched to see the implication that the man who prides himself on his freedom from all control, even self-control, is likely to end up not by being truly free but by serving a far worse master in his own unrestrained passions and desires. There is an added irony: the Callicles who advocates such a condition is the one who confidently proclaimed that it was *philosophers* who did not know how to deal with human pleasures and desires (484d5).

II

That there are fundamental inconsistencies in Callicles' political position has been pointed out, notably, by Charles Kahn ('Drama and Dialectic in Plato's *Gorgias*', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983), 75–122, at 100). Callicles despises the common people (483b5, 489c4) and yet, as Socrates repeatedly emphasizes, must pander to their opinions if he is to gain influence among them. He is introduced as a lover of the *Demos* (481d4, cf. 513c7); to be powerful in Athens he will have to make himself as like as possible to the Athenian people and the established constitution (513a2, b1). Indeed, one of the few remarks by Socrates with which he expresses genuine and spontaneous agreement is that

the person who wants to avoid being the victim of injustice must either be a ruler himself or be a friend of the established authority (510a10), subsequently described as his 'master' (*δεσπότης*, 510d7-see below). Socrates develops his argument with reference to a city ruled by a tyrant, but it clearly applies whatever the form of the dominant power in the state (cf. 513a; E.R. Dodds, *Plato: Gorgias*, Oxford 1959, p.350; Irwin, op. cit., p.230).

Callicles' view of natural justice is that the superior (*κρείττω*) should rule over the inferior (*ἥττων*) and gain the advantage (483d5). This leads him into difficulties, as Kahn (op. cit. 98-100) shows, when Socrates points out that in a democracy the majority, though weak as individuals, can exercise mastery over the strong individual by banding together against him (488d ff.). This is emphatically not a state of affairs that Callicles endorses; there are certain people who from their very nature deserve to rule (489c). That is to say, those who ought to prevail and those who in fact prevail are not necessarily the same for him. After all, Xerxes, whose invasion of Greece is for Callicles an exercising of the natural rights of the stronger – 483d6 – notoriously did not prevail (cf. Irwin, op. cit., p.175. Given that Plato maliciously causes Callicles to make this sort of slip, I find it hard to agree with Dodds p.271 that Callicles' failure to remember accurately the passage of Pindar that he quotes – 484b10 – is simply Plato's device to preserve dramatic verisimilitude by avoiding a long quotation, and not also irony at Callicles' expense.)

With this in mind, one may note a possible further significance in the words in which Callicles is made to formulate his thesis. This may or may not have been consciously intended by Plato – I see no clear pointers that it was; but it may aid our reflection on the dialogue.

As we have just seen, Callicles speaks of the natural right to rule of those who are superior (*κρείττονες*), even if they do not always rule in practice. Now rhetoric – which is the ostensible theme of the *Gorgias* as a whole – was proverbially the technique which could make the inferior or weaker (*ἥττω*) argument prevail and be superior or stronger (*κρείττω*) (cf. Plato, *Apology* 18b, and Protagoras fr.6a Diels-Kranz); and Gorgias himself had said that it enabled the ignorant to seem wiser than the knowledgeable (456b, 459ac; cf. 452e). To speak of making the weaker argument the stronger presupposes one of two things. (1) It may be that the stronger argument is just that which, as it turns out, prevails on a particular occasion, so that there is no reference to arguments being intrinsically better or stronger in themselves even if they do not always prevail in practice. Or else (2) there is implied reference to some such objective standard; and in that case rhetoric helps arguments to prevail which in fact should not.

The *Gorgias* is concerned with rhetoric in the context of the political power it can give and of the ideals which should govern the conduct of public life. In practice there may have been many factors other than skill in argument and debate involved in the achieving of political influence; but for the purposes of the *Gorgias* it is this that is central. There is thus as it were an association between powerful men and the arguments which they use to gain power; and the same choice applies to arguments and to those who use them. Either (1) we cannot distinguish the question who *should* rule from the question who as a matter of fact *does* rule; the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and those who have power – even if they are conventional Athenian democrats – deserve it. Or else (2) there *are* some people who deserve power more than others, but rhetoric is a technique for upsetting the balance of nature and diverting events from the course they *should* take; it will enable the weaker politician, in the sense of the one who *ought* to be weaker, to become the stronger. That too is something that Callicles ought not to welcome.

Callicles, unlike Polus (in so far as he has thought about it), and like Socrates, does believe that morality is founded in objective reality, even though the morality he recognizes is not that which everyone would accept, and especially not that which Socrates would accept. Rhetoric, at least as conventionally defined, is a more suitable tool for those like Polus – a professional rhetorician – who are not unduly worried about objective values. To the extent that rhetoric is regarded as a way of producing the appearance of superiority where it does not actually exist, it consorts ill with a theory of justice like Callicles' based on the claim that certain individuals are in actual fact superior by nature, even if their superiority is not always realized in practice.

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Lesbia, arriving at Allius' house for her clandestine liaison with Catullus, steps on the threshold (70-72). This, in the opinion of many recent interpreters, is an ill-omened action for one who is portrayed in effect as a bride.¹ But this view rests on a confusion. No evidence has been produced that *treading* on a threshold was ever unlucky, even for a bride (others, of course, trod on thresholds without qualm, which is why Allius' threshold is 'worn'); *stumbling* was unlucky, whether or not on a threshold, and not only for brides.² As a precaution against an unlucky stumble on her formal entry into the new house, a Roman bride would, by convention, step (or be lifted) over the threshold;³ but the possible stumble, not the step on the threshold itself, was the ill-omened thing that was shunned. Lesbia omits this precaution; but there is nothing sinister about that—she is not a bride. And she does not stumble;⁴ so there is no ill omen in her action.

Lesbia is not a bride, and (therefore) does not behave like one; this needs to be emphasized against the trend of recent interpretation. When we are told (for example) that 'Lesbia is at first represented as coming to the house of Allius like a bride to the bridegroom's house' (70f.)⁵ a protest is in order: Lesbia is represented as coming to Allius' house — just that; there is nothing up to 72 that invites us to think of her as a bride. Indeed, the very fact that it is not Catullus' house she comes to forcibly reminds us of her real status.

If, therefore, we wish to understand the simile which begins in 73 as likening Lesbia to Laodamia in respect of being a bride (*coniugis ut quondam . . .*), we shall have to say that at this point in the poem Catullus introduces a new perspective on his affair. There is nothing intrinsically implausible in that. But this understanding of the simile is not inevitable. Ancient rhetoric and literary criticism recognized the partial-correspondence simile as a legitimate device.⁶ From this point of view, there is nothing to prevent us discounting Laodamia's marital status as irrelevant to the point of the comparison; on the contrary, since we *know* that Lesbia is not a bride, there is a strong *prima facie* reason for so doing.

Nor is there any compelling reason to revise this judgement when we discover in 133-4 that Lesbia is attended by Cupid dressed *crocina . . . in tunica*. It is true, as many commentators have pointed out, that the colour is associated with marriage, and is the colour of Hymen's clothing;⁷ but that is not the colour's invariable connotation. It is, more generally, luxurious and effeminate; and it is divine.⁸ Cupid is dressed like that because he is dainty and divine, not because he is attending a marriage — which he is not.

Moreover, Catullus knows that he is not. Lyne comments on 143-6: 'the implication that Catullus imagined specifically a wedding is confirmed by the sequel. When the romantic vision of

¹ Without attempting to be comprehensive, I note: S. Baker, *CP* 55(1960), 172; G. Lieberg, *Puella Divina* (Amsterdam, 1962), 207-9; R. O. A. M. Lyne, *The Latin Love Poets* (Oxford, 1980), 60; C. W. Macleod, *Collected Papers* (Oxford, 1983), 164; J. Sarkissian, *Catullus 68* (Mnemosyne Supplement 76, 1983), 17; C. J. Tuplin, *CQ* 31(1981), 117; G. Williams, *Figures of Thought in Roman Poetry* (New Haven, 1980), 54; T. P. Wiseman, *Catullus and His World* (Cambridge, 1985), 161.

² *Cic. Div.* 2. 84; *Ov. Am.* 1. 12. 3-4, *Met.* 10. 452; *Tib.* 1. 3. 19-20.

³ *Cat.* 61. 159-61; *Lucan.* 2. 359; *Plaut. Cas.* 815; *Plut. Qu. Rom.* 29; Varro ap. Servius on *Ecl.* 8. 29.

⁴ At *V. Aen.* 2. 243 *substitit* is ominous because the Horse comes to an unintended halt; but here *constituit* suggests rather a deliberate pause: Lesbia marks her arrival with a dramatic gesture.

⁵ Tuplin (n. 1), 117. Compare Lyne (n. 1), 59: 'The text in this respect is quite explicit. The myth opens with Laodamia's arrival at Protesilaus' house as a bride; and that (the arrival at a *domus*) is the immediate point of contact between the situation of the myth and the situation of Catullus and Lesbia.' Lyne rightly did not say 'the arrival at a *domus* as a bride'; but that is what is needed if the text is to be 'quite explicit' in the respect Lyne suggests.

⁶ Rhetoric: e.g., *ad Herr.* 4. 61; criticism: frequently in the Homeric scholia, e.g. on *Il.* 11. 474-81. Fuller documentation in M. Heath, *Unity in Greek Poetics* (Oxford, forthcoming), chapter 8.

⁷ *Cat.* 61. 9-10; *Lucan.* 2. 361; *Ov. Met.* 10. 1, *Her.* 21. 164

⁸ Luxurious: Varro *Men.* 314; effeminate: Sen. *Phaedra* 322, Fronto 18. 5-6 van den Hout; divine: V. Fl. 8. 234 (admittedly a matrimonial context, but the *croceo subtegmine vestes* are taken from Venus' wardrobe, not made for the occasion; cf. also Apuleius *Met.* 11. 3. 5). Aurora (for obvious reasons) and Bacchus (*Tib.* 1. 7. 46; Sen. *Oed.* 421) are also associated with the colour.

the myth is demolished, the idea of a wedding is specifically rebutted' (59). Certainly Catullus denies that he is married to Lesbia; that hardly proves that he had previously imagined otherwise: the denial need not be read as a self-correction. In fact Catullus takes it for granted and uses it as a premise in a complex argument *a fortiori*: if Juno, who is a goddess and married, tolerates her partner's frequent infidelities, so must I, who enjoy neither prerogative, tolerate Lesbia's occasional infidelities (135-48; admittedly the lacuna after 141 gives rise to some uncertainty here). These lines, arguing from a difference in the scale of the offence (*rara plurima*) and from a twofold difference in the status of the offended party, should not be read as a drama in which the self-deceiving lover wins through to a realization of the truth; they form a careful and witty rhetorical structure, which presupposes the truth of its premises from the outset.⁹

I can see no reason to believe, therefore, that Catullus assimilates his relationship to Lesbia to marriage at any point in this poem. This means that the relationship is not likened to the mythical marriage in the simile in respect of its being a marriage; nor, if Lesbia's arrival was not ill-omened, can it be likened to the mythical marriage in respect of its inauspicious beginnings. Consequently, the content of the long simile which compares Lesbia on her arrival to Laodamia on hers is only relevant to the simile's frame and ostensible motivation in part. In part (I think) it is relevant to itself; and in part it is relevant to the lament for Catullus' brother — which is in turn a third distinct theme, which Catullus has not attempted to integrate fully with the erotic frame.

Tuplin has, indeed, argued that the lament and the frame are 'closely interconnected' (117). At the end of the poem, he observes, 'it is evident that Catullus' reaction is not what it had once been, burning and weeping with frustration (51f.)'. He continues: 'The psychological basis of the change is, I suggest, the feeling that Lesbia — as, after all, simply the object of an illegitimate relationship — cannot be allowed to command the extremes of emotional reaction, a feeling brought home to Catullus by the experience of the loss of his brother. The claims of fraternal *amor* outweigh those of erotic love and should be taken more seriously; on the loss of the object of that *amor* Catullus realizes that it is not appropriate to go on regarding Lesbia in the light in which he had previously seen her' (118). But this attempt to give the brother a pivotal role in the poem's thematic structure fails (his pivotal role in the formal structure of the poem is, of course, not in dispute). Catullus' *reaction* has indeed changed; but that change is not in need of explanation: in 51f., his passion was frustrated; now, thanks to Allius, it is not (we are hardly meant to forget the very service which it is the poem's professed aim to immortalize). As to Catullus' 'regard' for Lesbia, I can see no evidence of change at all: *mihi quae me carior ipso est, lux mea, qua viva vivere dulce mihi est*; these are expressions of unqualified devotion to the woman he values still *longe ante omnes*. Indeed, if we try to correlate these concluding lines with the lament for the poet's brother, so far from finding integration, we must confront an apparent contradiction: the death of his brother has deprived Catullus of what, while Lesbia lives, he still has. Compare *iucundum lumen* (93) with *lux mea* (160), *omnia tecum una perierunt gaudia nostra* (95) with *qua viva vivere dulce mihi est* (160). This contradiction is real and (so far as I can see) ineliminable.

That a poet should contradict himself is not, in itself, perturbing. By and large, we do not read poetry with a view to extracting a consistent set of propositions; we may be more interested in (for example) how convincingly the poet sustains an assumed role in a given context. This is, I take it, obvious when the contexts are whole poems; that is, we are relatively unperturbed by inconsistencies of attitude in separate poems. Where one poem is concerned, we are perhaps inclined to expect a stricter material unity. But the habits acquired in one culture will not necessarily be helpful in elucidating the literature of another culture. There is evidence that the autonomous elaboration of individual elements within a single text was an accepted technique of literary composition in the Greco-Roman

⁹ Of course, the poet may be hinting that the lover is deceived in *rara*; but if so, the lover is not disillusioned in this poem.

On this view, it would simply not be true to say that 'a Catullan poem is always about some one thing'; it is true that 'to work as a poem it must have some kind of unity': but unity can be conceived also in terms of (for example) the formal ordering of a multiplicity of themes.¹⁰

To locate a poem's unity at the formal, rather than the material, level is not to say that its themes, as such, are wholly unrelated to each other; in our poem, Catullus takes care to articulate the transitions from theme to theme materially as well as formally: the partial interrelations on which we have already commented provide a point of contact or departure for each new theme. But the transitions are nevertheless between distinct themes (and not, for example, between different manifestations or aspects of a single superordinate theme). It is this which gives rise to the contradiction: in two contexts Catullus expresses the incomparable importance to him of some other person—as is entirely appropriate to a lament, entirely appropriate to a love poem; the juxtaposition of the two contexts yields an inconsistency. But no reader is obliged (or indeed ever able) to attend to or reckon as important *every* feature of a poem; which features are made salient and valued (or devalued) in any reading will depend on the presuppositions which the reader brings to the text. Readers tolerant (as ancient readers were) of thematic proliferation will not wish to force this poem's disparate contexts into confrontation; they will be rewarded for their restraint with a poem correspondingly richer and more diverse in interest.

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Review: **Martin Helzle** (Bangor)

LCM 13.8 (Oct. 1988) 119-120

Ernst Doblhofer, *Exil und Emigration: zum Erlebnis der Heimatferne in der römischen Literatur*, Impulse der Forschung, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1987. Paper, 44DM. ISBN 3-534-08802-6.

On the basis of Prof. Doblhofer's recent publications¹ one would expect the present volume to be mainly concerned with Ovid. To a certain extent, Ovidians will not be disappointed, but they will also find a great deal of valuable information which goes beyond Ovid. There is, for instance, an exhaustive commented bibliography at the beginning which saved the present reviewer from overlooking at least one title. It is worth while, however, to draw attention here to the compendious 1986 Stellenbosch dissertation *Poeta, exsul vates: a stylistic and literary analysis of Ovid's Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto* by Jo-Marie Claassen who comes to some of the same conclusions as Prof. Doblhofer.

After an exhaustive collection of the commonplaces concerning exile Doblhofer launches into his analysis. This falls into two parts: 1. the various forms of banishment; 2. the forms of homesickness; 3. the different ways of self-assertion. Under these headings he deals with extensive passages of Cicero, Ovid and Seneca, but also Vergil's *Eclogue* 8 and *Aeneid* 8, *Catalepton* 3 and 8, and

¹⁰ The quotations are from K. Quinn, *Didaskolos* 2(1986), 119 [= *Approaches to Catullus* (Cambridge, 1972), 103]. The approach to questions of unity in ancient literature which I adopt here is developed more fully, in the context of an extensive survey of the ancient secondary literature, in Heath (n. 6). For one illustration of the tendency towards self-contained elaboration in ancient literary practice, see my *Poetics of Greek Tragedy* (London, 1987), 132-7, on digressive rhetoric in tragedy.

¹ 'Ovids Spiel mit Zweifel und Verzweiflung', *WJA* N.F.4 (1978), 121ff.; 'Ovids Exilpoesie-Mittel, Frucht und Denkmal dichterischer Selbstbehauptung', *AU* 1/234 (1980), 59ff.; 'Ovids Abschied von Rom. Versuch einer Modellinterpretation von *trist.* 1, 3', *AU* 1/23 (1980), 80ff.; I have not had access to 'Exil und Emigration. Das Erlebnis der Verbannung in der römischen Literatur', *Dialog Schule-Wissenschaft* 16, München (1982) 5ff..

even Horace. The wide scope of literary analyses and the illuminating comparison between ancient and modern exile-topoi² make up for the generous quotation and translation³ and some inevitable duplication with earlier articles⁴.

Doblhofer's analysis of specific passages is frequently refreshing and incisive. His interpretation, for instance, of *Pont.*1.8 views the poem against the background of Ovid's earlier works and Augustan poetry. When contrasting vv. 29-39 and 51-60 he concludes: "Der Gegensatz zwischen dem *Ovidius urbanus* und dem *Ovidius agrestis* grenzt an das Selbstironische-Komische". It is crucial to see clearly that the author presents his life in Tomis as the opposite of Rome. The contrast is deliberate and, in the case of *Pont.*1.8.51ff., not devoid of self-irony. Again and again Prof. Doblhofer shows that interpretation of the relevant texts can be pushed further. A *propos Tristia* 1.5 on Ovid's *Odysseus synkrisis* he shows that even a theme which has been dealt with at length⁵ can be further illuminated; for on p.279 he remarks: "Da drängt sich die Erinnerung auf, dass ja schon Homer den Namen Odysseus auf *ὀδυσεσθαι* 'grollen, zürnen' zurückführt, und zwar überwiegend im passiven Sinn, wonach der Name 'der vom Zorn Verfolgte bedeutet' ". This observation adds spice to the somewhat lengthy passages at *Trist.*1.557-584 and *Pont.*4.10.9-30. Such etymological considerations are extremely appropriate when dealing with Ovid, who sometimes uses similar derivations of names quite openly, e.g. *est quaedam nomine Dipsas anus* (*Am.*1.8.2)⁶. Such observations and others enrich our understanding not only of Ovid but also of exile-literature in general, especially when Doblhofer compares classical literature with 20th century authors (e.g. 135f., 141ff., 156). This wider perspective saves him from the fallacy of separating literature and life⁷. Doblhofer is interested in the author's psyche as well as in the literature⁸.

Considering this abundance of valuable information, it is perhaps bewildering to see an expert refer to Catullus 63 as an elegy, and state that Ovid, the author of a *Medea*, had not written anything for the theatre before exile. He invites disagreement when he treats *Anthologia Latina* 236 and 410 as Senecan⁹. Since authorship is not the issue it would be worth pointing out that these epigrams are relevant regardless of who wrote them and when.

The book's major asset seems to me to be its literary emphasis. There is no need for a new collection of similarities between Cicero, Ovid and Seneca¹⁰, nor for a legal or historical study of the phenomenon of exile¹¹. What is needed is a comprehensive study of the Latin exile-literature *qua* literature. Despite its selective, highlighting approach, Prof. Doblhofer's book comes close to providing this.

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² E.g. pp.66-72.

³ E.g. pp.81-86

⁴ E.g. 102ff., acknowledged by the author.

⁵ Still fundamental: F.Rahn, 'Ovids elegische Epistel', *A&A* 7 (1958) 105ff. = *Ovid*, WdF, ed. V.Albrecht-Zinn, Darmstadt (1968), 476ff..

⁶ See also *Trist.*3.5.177f. and *Pont.*1.2.1 *Maxime, qui tanti mensuram nominis implet*.

⁷ An extreme example of this is A.D.Fitton Brown, 'The unreality of Ovid's exile', *LCM* 10.2 (Feb.1985), 19ff.. A much better approach is Niall Rudd, 'The Style and the Man', *Phoenix* 18 (1964), 216ff., whose findings about Horace could be applied to Ovid. It is also imperative not to rely on temperature charts issued by the Romanian National Tourist Board.

⁸ A good example of this is his analysis of the commonplace of exile as death, pp.166f..

⁹ In the case of *AL* 236 he takes the precaution of a conditional clause: 'Wenn das Epigramm *AL* 236 in der Tat von Seneca stammt . . .'

¹⁰ See e.g. H.M.R.Leopoldt, *Exulum trias sive de Cicerone, Ovidio, Seneca exulibus*, diss. Utrecht 1904.

¹¹ E.L.Grasmück, *Exilium: Untersuchungen zur Verbannung in der Antike*, Paderborn-München-Wien-Zürich 1978. J.Siebert, *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte*, IdF, Darmstadt 1979.

Anon (Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, Jan 1841):
The speeches in Thucydides

MUCH misconception prevails on the subject of ancient oratory. When the eloquence of Greece and Rome is the theme, two great names arise out of the darkness of ages, as embodying to our conceptions all that is excellent in that glorious art. We are in the habit of looking back to Demosthenes and Cicero as those who have "sounded all the depths and shoals of honour" in the difficult achievement of carrying men captive by the power of language; and as models for the young aspirant who aims at victory in intellectual debate, we are apt to think that these two stand not only prominent but alone. Yet we doubt not that the greater number of those who talk most familiarly of these illustrious dead know little of their peculiar characteristics, and, deceived by the common verdict of mankind in their favour, fancy that in their speeches will be found all that the highest triumphs of oratory can accomplish; and that, therefore, to imitate them is to ensure success. Ignorance is ever fond of generalizing, and cannot use the faculty of discrimination. Hence it is that we find extravagant praise or censure issuing from the lips of those who have but a superficial knowledge of the subject on which they speak. Like men of imperfect vision — who are mistaken in their estimate of objects, because they cannot distinguish their shades of colour or differences of form, and have only a confused notion of something graceful or beautiful or sublime before them — the sciolists of literature are unable to separate the good from the bad — to sift the wheat from the chaff — in the writers whose merits they undertake to appreciate. Hence it is that we always find popular idols held up to our admiration as beings of faultless and superhuman excellence. The vulgar cannot bear to see calm judgment preparing her weights and scales, and are indignant to think that what is so beautiful should be submitted to the knife of the critical anatomist. As a proof of this, we may instance the common opinions as to the merits of some of the greatest writers of former times. Those who are least intimately versed in their productions, having been accustomed from their youth upwards to hear their names quoted with reverence, and their sentiments cited with applause, regard them at last with so superstitious a feeling as to palliate their most obvious imperfections, or perhaps deny the existence of any imperfections at all. It was much in this spirit that so many of the ancients looked upon the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* not only as absolutely free from faults, but, devoutly believing that the Father of epic poetry must have had an intellect of gigantic dimensions, regarded

his poems as a sort of repository and encyclopaedia of all knowledge. So with respect to our own Shakspeare — how difficult it is to convince many of the possibility of inconsistency and false taste in any of the plays of that mighty master! — how impossible to make them feel the force of the very just and sober judgment of Dr Johnson, that "Shakspeare with his excellences has likewise faults, and faults sufficient to obscure and overwhelm any other merit!"

In the same manner, men are led away when they talk of the ancient orators. Without giving themselves the trouble to analyse their speeches, and discover the distinctive features which secured for each a reputation for a particular excellence, as well as note the absence of many of the requisites for a composition at all approaching to perfection, they think and speak of them as masterpieces which contain all that eloquence can supply for the attainment of her high and noble ends. We are persuaded that comparatively few know wherein consists the great excellence of Demosthenes as an orator. But, before we proceed, it will be better to premise a few remarks:—

There are two kinds of oratory. The one local — passionate and transitory, admirably adapted for the attainment of a particular end in view, by working upon the feelings and persuading the will of the multitude — thoroughly objective and unideal in its character, and as intended for the purposes of the moment, making use of such arguments as are popular and easily apprehended, though sophistical and illogical. The other philosophical, calm, and permanent — comprehensive in its views, laboured in its demonstrations, and imaginative in its character — influencing the will through the understanding, rather than the understanding through the will, and elucidating principles rather than occupying itself with results.

It is easy to see that the former is the kind best adapted for securing the purpose of the hour, and producing a sensible and immediate effect. In every popular auditory the majority consists of men who possess that excitable state of feeling which is too impatient to wait for the slow process of ratiocination, and eagerly seizes upon topics which appeal to the passions rather than the judgment. This is a truth of which all demagogues know well how to appreciate the importance. In them, indeed, public speaking too often assumes its most degraded form. Destitute of the higher qualities of mind, confused in their ideas by the mists of prejudice and ignorance, and incompetent to follow out, in reasoning, their principles to their legitimate applications, they appear upon the stage of life as

panders to the follies, the vices, and the crimes which too often disgrace the acts of an irrational multitude. But we would by no means be understood to contend, that the first of the two kinds into which we have divided oratory is solely applied, or applicable, to a bad purpose. It is a weapon for good as well as for evil; and when used by men who are wise enough to appreciate, and honest enough to admit, the evils of popular licentiousness, may become an instrument in their hands of beneficial and effective power.

Now we maintain that the eloquence of Demosthenes falls under our first division, and is strongly marked by its characteristic features. The word which Longinus uses to describe his idea of its nature, is one of the happiest that could be selected. He talks of the *δεινότης* of Demosthenes — a Greek word for which “energetic force” or “nervousness” seems to be the most appropriate translation. In examining the torrent eloquence of this great orator, we are struck with the almost total absence of any thing like philosophical or general reflection. Few sentences occur which remain to mankind as a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰ*, applicable at all times, and in all political societies, because embodying principles of abstract truth. Hence it is that of his speeches which have come down to us, few contain maxims of political wisdom that can be disjoined from the peculiar occasions, and special emergencies which he was endeavouring to meet. Principles of government are not there propounded and discussed. Springs of action are not assigned and traced to their consequences — remote effects are not deduced from certain though unapparent causes. Let it not be thought that we are insensible to the merits of Demosthenes as an orator — we are only anxious that those merits should be distinctly understood, and not confounded with others which, for his purpose, he could well afford to do without. No one can read a page of that fiery eloquence without feeling his spirit burn within him, and confessing how resistless must have been its force when rolling like thunder over the heads of the Athenian multitude. Every chord is touched — every passion played upon — every sympathy awakened — quick, startling, and abrupt, he appeals to every consideration which could move the most easily excited populace in Greece. If he has to crush an opponent, he deals blow after blow with terrific force, and language seems to fail under the withering power of his indignant eloquence. If he wishes to animate the sinking spirit of his countrymen, he pours around them the flood of their ancient glory, and swears by the souls of those who fell at Marathon, that victory shall be theirs. Impatient of detail, and unwilling to entangle

himself and his audience with the intricacies of circumstantial facts, he launches forth the arrows of invective, and by a sarcasm and a sneer, breathes out the intensity of contempt which he feels, or affects to feel, for the conduct he is holding up to reprobation. Another great feature of his oratory is, the irresistible conviction it leaves upon the mind, of sincerity in the speaker. It is impossible to believe that he is not thoroughly in earnest, and this is one of the most essential requisites in an orator who wishes to **116** persuade. He fully realizes the truth of the precept given by Horace:—

“Si vis me fleres, dolendum est

Primum ipsi tibi.”

But our intention at present is not to analyse the eloquence of Demosthenes so much, as to use it as an illustration of the first of the two kinds into which we have divided oratory.

As the best example of the second, we would instance Burke. Endowed with a mind which could grasp the universe, and revelling in the luxuriance of a prodigal imagination, he stood upon an intellectual eminence from which he was enabled to throw his clear-sighted vision over all the varieties of human institutions — on every subject he sought to enucleate principles, and then with unerring sagacity point out the progress of their development. Too proud in the consciousness of truth to resort to sophistry, and too confident in his own boundless resources to stoop to the petty tricks of inferior minds, (except indeed in one memorable instance, the dagger-scene, where being inconsistent with himself, he signally failed) he presented for the acceptance of his audience grand and sweeping maxims of political wisdom, the truth of which he so powerfully demonstrated as to make it a matter of wonder how any could remain unconvinced and unpersuaded. Sometimes, indeed, the eagle wings of his imagination carried him too far; but still his flight was ever towards the sun. His speeches embrace not only the practice but the science of governments; and now that the occasions that called them forth have ceased to exist, and the tumults and passions in the midst of which they were uttered have died away, they remain as manuals for the statesman, and treasures for the philosopher. Like Cassandra of old, he was fated to be disbelieved by the party whom he stretched forth his arm to save from the abysmal depths of revolutionary fury; and yet his warnings were as oracular as those of the Phrygian prophetess. For him, coming events did indeed cast their shadows before, and he knew well how to predict what those events were which would assuredly follow: because he reasoned from cause to effect, in the spirit of true philosophic induction; and drew from the

depths of human nature itself, the principles which guided him to his conclusions.

We have thus far spoken of Burke, because we believe him to be the most perfect example of the philosophical orator. There is, if we may so express it, a vitality in his speeches which renders them as enduring as the language in which they are expressed. They are, to a great extent, condensations of political experience, embodying views of society, which it is of the last importance for the practical legislator to study and understand. Amongst the ancients, few of those who studied speaking as an art, carried the spirit of philosophy to the *bema* or the rostrum. Perhaps amongst the professed public speeches which time has spared us as the compositions of the *rheto*rs of antiquity, those of such men as Isocrates and Lysias, who were paid to write them for the use of others, approach most nearly to the particular kind of eloquence which we have last discussed.

But there is another class of speeches totally different, in their nature, from these hired labours of the advocate, on which we think it may be useful to be somewhat more copious in our remarks. These are the specimens of oratory which we find interspersed in the histories written by the ancients, and our present intention is to devote ourselves principally to those which occur in the history of Thucydides. Lord Chatham is said to have recommended this author and Demosthenes as those whom the youthful orator should study, in preference to all others, if he sought to arrive at excellence in his art. Demosthenes himself had anticipated this opinion with regard to Thucydides; and it is a well-attested fact, that he transcribed the work of that historian eight times with his own hand. We do not hesitate to say, that we hardly know where we could find a more useful exercise of mind, than in an attentive perusal and intelligent examination of the speeches attributed, in the history of the Peloponnesian war, to different soldiers, orators, and statesmen. As to how far they were the actually delivered sentiments, the *ipsissima verba* of the different speakers, Thucydides himself, informs us that his intention was not to aim at verbal accuracy, or even general sameness of expression; but, 117 to translate his own words,* "with regard to strict accuracy in reporting what was said, it was difficult both for me to remember what I have myself heard, and for those who from various quarters brought me information. But I have attributed speeches according as it appeared to me likely that the speakers

would have delivered them on emergencies as they arose, keeping as closely as possible to the spirit and tenor of those which were actually delivered." This, then, is the nature of the speeches in Thucydides. They are orations adapted by the historian to the occasions on which he introduces them. At the same time, they have a substratum of fidelity, and represent with tolerable exactness the views and arguments of those into whose mouths they are put. But, without the ingenuous confession of the writer, it would have been easy to decide that they were not the offspring of particular emergencies, and addressed in the shape in which we read them to the rude soldiery or tumultuous *ecclesia*. The speeches which occur in the History of Livy are declamatory and popular enough to have been really uttered at the time, and by the persons there represented; but several circumstances concur to make us abandon such a supposition. Thanks to the deep research and far-sighted sagacity of Niebuhr, we now know how much of the stately fabric of Roman history, as it grows up in the immortal work of Livy, is the creature of his imagination — shaping, combining, and modifying the scanty materials which early antiquity supplied, and in the true spirit of Roman patriotism making every incident subservient to the great object of his idolatry, an increase of the greatness of the Eternal City. And when such is the case with important facts, can we doubt that his own exuberant genius framed for his own purposes such speeches as best suited the character and pretensions of his work? Besides, the utter impossibility of his having any access to records of what was publicly spoken in the earlier periods of the Republic, (for in those days there were no shorthand writers at Rome,) proves that by far the greater number are pure fictions; and that of the rest, the meagre and scanty skeletons of tradition have been clothed with flesh and sinews by the creative intellect of the historian. Their origin is betrayed in the praise of Rome, and every thing that is Roman; and the writer, in his eagerness to eulogize his country, too often forgets the dramatic propriety which requires the speeches to be consistent with the character and situation of the speakers.

Of a very different stamp are those which we meet with in the pages of Thucydides. So little was he carried away with a spirit of undue partiality for Athens and her institutions, that Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his elaborate parallel between that historian and Herodotus, accuses him of a spiteful malignity towards his native city, as though he took a morbid pleasure in

* Χαλεπον την ακριβειαν αυτην των λεχθεντων διαμνημονευσαι ην εμοι τε ων αυτος ηκουσα και τοις αλλοθεν ποθεν εμοι απαγγελουσιν' ως δ' αν εδοκουν μοι εκαστοι περι των αι παροντων τα δεοντα μαλιστα ειπειν, εχομεν οτι εγγυτα της ξυμπασης γνωμης των αληθως λεχθεντων ουτως ειρηται — Thuc. i. c. 32

narrating the defeats and losses which the Athenians sustained, in revenge for their ungenerous treatment of himself by condemning him to exile — a sentence so common against the most illustrious citizens, that Cicero speaks of it as “*id quod optimo cuique Athenis accidere solitum est.*”† This charge of unfair resentment cherished in the breast of Thucydides against his countrymen is utterly without foundation; but truth may be a libel, and too often in the history of the Grecian states does the faithful recorder of events appear as a calumniator. Thucydides lived in one of the most remarkable periods of Grecian history, and he has left us an imperishable record of the views, objects, failures, and successes of the various states then engaged in the longest and fiercest struggle that had yet convulsed his native country. In his narration of events he strictly confines himself to the province of a relater. He seldom adds any comments of his own, except when, as in his masterly account of the horrors which civil war had poured out upon Corcyra,* the thought of the ruin which jarring and selfish strife had brought upon unhappy Greece, forces from him the language of indignant sorrow. The practice which later writers introduced of mixing up their own opinions with the statement of facts which it is their office simply to record, had not yet commenced, and it is not in the narrative, but the speeches of Thucydides, that we must look for the opinions of this grave and judicious writer. Fully to enter into the spirit of these latter, we must remember the birthplace and events during the life of the historian. He was a native of Athens — “a citizen of no mean city,” “the eye of Greece; mother of arts and eloquence” — of small extent and scanty population, and yet one which has influenced the destinies of mankind. Her inhabitants were lively and intelligent to a degree of which we, who live in a grosser clime, can scarce form a conception; — and this it will be requisite to bear in mind, if we would rightly appreciate the character of Athenian oratory. Their keen perception of the beautiful, exhibited itself in their philosophy, their poetry, their sculpture, and their architecture. Every free citizen was born to a glorious inheritance, and was surrounded by objects which, while they gratified his vanity, purified and refined his taste.

Proud in the consciousness that his native town was one of the leading states of Greece, and that he individually was one of the arbiters of her fortunes, he identified himself thoroughly with her interests, and felt that the ends of his own ambition were best served

when her greatness was most advanced. The prosperity of his own city bore much more immediately upon the comfort and happiness of a Grecian citizen than we are apt to think, from the fact that, beyond its walls, he had no country upon which his patriotism could expand itself, and the small territory of Greece, with whose general welfare that of his particular state ought to have been identified, was occupied by enemies too often as irreconcilably hostile as if they had nothing in common with himself in name, language, and religion. Such an appeal, therefore, as that of Pericles, when he defended himself before his countrymen, who at that time were, as Thucydides tells us — *πανταχοθεν τη γυνμη αποροι καθεστωτες* — on the brink of despair — must have come home to their feelings with no ordinary force — *καλως μεν γαρ φερομενος ανηρ το καθ' εαυτον, διαφθειρομενης της πατριδος ουδεν ησπον ξυναπολλυται· κακοτυχων δε εν ευτυχουση πολλω μαλλον διασωζεται.* †

Thucydides lived in the zenith of Athenian power. He was forty years of age at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war; and Athens, since the Persian invasion, and foolish conduct of Pausanias, which alienated the inferior states from the Lacedæmonian interest, had gradually, during the fifty years which had elapsed, been attaining the great object of her ambition, the *ήγεμονια*, or lead in Greece. *Αθηναιοι την τε αρχην εγκρατιστην κατεστησαντο, και αυτοι επι μεγα εχωρησαν δυναμει.* ‡ Her natural advantages and resources are ably stated by Pericles in the first book, and in the chapter of the second where Thucydides introduces that illustrious Athenian, as strongly urging his fellow-citizens to retire from the open country within their walls, and not risk the issue of the war on the chances of a battle. Her naval force was the finest in the world. Her colonies and dependent § cities were numerous and wealthy, from which there accrued a yearly revenue that averaged 600 talents. Her treasury in the Acropolis contained 6000 talents of coined silver money, besides a large quantity of gold and silver, which, in the shape of sacred offerings and ornaments, was laid up in the temples, and estimated at the value of 500 talents of gold, and which Pericles told his countrymen might be employed without sacrilege in cases of emergency for the defence of their native land. The heavy armed force and cavalry were likewise numerous and well appointed.

Such was the condition of Athens at the outset of the Peloponnesian war — a war in which she would assuredly have triumphed if the great statesman who

† De Oratore, ii. 13.

* Thuc. iii. 82, et seq.

† Ib. ii. 60.

‡ Ib. i. 118.

§ *φορον ύπηκοι.*

alone seemed able "to wield the fierce democracy" had lived, or her giddy and unthinking populace had been content to follow out the wise policy which his prudence had foreshown. But the curse of democracy was upon her, and she became the sport of the eddying passions of the multitude. Throughout the whole of the instructive history of this period, while we admire the courageous spirit and untiring energies of the Athenian people, we blush to see them, with all the versatility of a mob, yielding to the will of the demagogue of the day, and at one moment, in obedience to the brawling and brutal Cleon, voting the massacre of the hapless citizens of Mytilene, and at another responding with loud acclamations to the ambitious views of the young and hot-headed Alcibiades. Here lay the weakness of Athens. Within her walls democracy ran riot. "The many" were her absolute masters, and revelled in the exercise of uncontrolled and irresponsible power. On the stormy waves of popular applause the favourite of the hour rode triumphant, and the people did his bidding with reckless alacrity. Hobbes has defined democracy to be "an aristocracy of orators, interrupted only by the monarchy of a single orator;" and this applies with peculiar aptitude to the Grecian republics, and pre-eminently to Athens. Nature had been prodigal to her inhabitants in intellectual gifts. They were as quick-witted and intelligent as they were wayward and capricious. The poet and the orator had no difficulty in making them apprehend the drift of any allusion. On the stage no innuendo was ever lost to the ear of the multitude, and the slightest reference to the public men and measures of the time was unerringly caught, though masked by the broad humour and licentious wit of Aristophanes.

The character of the Athenians is brought out by Thucydides in strong contrast with that of their rivals the Lacedemonians; and we know no passage in the ancient writers where so lively a description is given of the distinguishing features of those two leading states, as in the speech * of the Corinthian legates when urging upon the Lacedemonians the necessity of espousing their quarrel with Athens. The whole oration is valuable, as throwing light upon the different fortunes of the two republics, resulting from their very different lines of policy; but we have in a few words a masterly sketch given of their opposite temperaments and characters. It is such an analysis of national character as we ought to be thoroughly acquainted with, if we would rightly understand Grecian history. Athens and Sparta were rivals and enemies. Democracy and

oligarchy scowled hatred on one another. Both were evil, and both contributed to ruin Greece.

When such was the character of the audience, we may cease to wonder at the nature of the speeches which were addressed to them, and can understand how the sharpened arrows of eloquence never missed their mark. We may believe that less of the refined logic and elaborate reasoning which we find in the orations of Thucydides is the work of the historian than at first view would seem likely, and from the remarks which have been premised, we may be better able to appreciate their worth.

But if the superficial student of Greek literature thinks that the speeches which occur in the history of the Peloponnesian war are within the sphere of his comprehension, he is mistaken. They are difficult in no ordinary degree. Cicero himself says of them, "*Ipsæ illæ conciones ita multas habent abditasque sententias, vix ut intelligantur.*" We know few specimens of the Greek language in which it is frequently so impossible to be quite sure of the correct interpretation, and in which it is so hopeless in many instances to reconcile the construction with the known idioms of the language. They ought to be the study of the statesman; and yet they are accessible only to the scholar, and too often they are abandoned to the pedant, who is too busily occupied with the husk to pay much attention to the kernel. It is a matter deeply to be regretted, that so much of the spirit ¹²⁰ and beauty of the ancient classics should be lost to many of those whose critical knowledge of the language is most exact. It is lamentable that by the youth of Britain, the glorious relics of the literature of Greece and Rome should be so frequently known solely with reference to academic reputation, and that microscopic accuracy should be so often attained at the expense of a liberal and instructive acquaintance with the spirit of the past. Those who are so careful about syllables think little of "the mind, the music, breathing" in the words, and are content with the dry bones of antiquity, instead of the living and informing soul. This is an old complaint, and has been well stated by Casaubon in his masterly preface to Polybius — a piece of composition which we recommend to the serious attention and study of every young classical scholar.

We would not be misunderstood. We have already deprecated the idea that shallow scholarship can essay to master the difficulties of the Greek language; and without an intimate and well practised knowledge of its constructions, and the peculiar force of

* Thuc. i. 69.

some of its words in their most subtle significations, passages whose sense is so interwoven with the context as to be necessary for its elucidation, must remain a sealed book to the man who has not taken the pains to acquire minute and critical knowledge. We do not undervalue the labours of the grammarian and philologist — the latter of whom has of late appeared as one of the most useful auxiliaries in the cause of truth and knowledge; we only wish to point out that there is something above and beyond these, simply in themselves, which is to them what the body is to the clothing; what the building is to the bricks and mortar employed in its construction. Let our public schools inculcate upon the young the necessity of sound and accurate scholarship — for they have to rear the sapling — but let our universities remember that language is but the vehicle of thought, and that from them we expect to see fruit “good for the use of man” growing upon the tree.

One reason of the difficulties which perplex the student in perusing the History of the Peloponnesian war is, that Thucydides was eminently a thinker. His sentences are not written *currente calamo*, nor are they such as he who runs may read. Few writers have compressed so much matter into so small a space. Bacon has said that “some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.” That of Thucydides is of the last kind; and to be relished, the appetite of the reader must be vigorous and healthy. The indolence of mankind is the great obstacle to the acquisition of useful knowledge. Two thousand years ago it was said by the historian, *οὕτως αταλαιπώρος ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα μᾶλλον τρεπονται* * — and the complaint may still be made. In his speeches, grammatical accuracy is necessary to apprehend the argument — although at times the sentences violate the idiom of the language — and careful attention to interpret the difficulties of construction. He does not affect the epigrammatic and caustic brevity of Tacitus, who, in his constant anxiety to be terse, frequently becomes obscure. That writer seems to have been oppressed with the nature of the events and characters which his pen recorded, and to have shunned a more ample delineation. Conscious of their depravity, he conveys by innuendo and sarcasm the opinion he had formed, but did not choose more openly to express. In the use and force of disjunctive prepositions, whereby his own sentiments are expressed in the latter clause of his sentence, he has no rival but Gibbon. He is close and reserved from deliberation and choice. And we confess we see a kind of congruity

between the subject and the style. Like Rembrandt, he appears at first sight to have concealed his portraiture; but if we examine the picture, we find every lineament distinct and intelligible. He did not merely chronicle events. He propounded political aphorisms, which, even in our day, have a living application. But still we are not blind to his faults as an author. His sententious maxims are too elliptical; and in supplying a ¹²¹ sense, there is too often a danger of mistaking his meaning. It is a style which few can imitate with success, and when unsuccessful it becomes affectation.

Thucydides is the second of the Greek historians, in point of time, whose works have come down to us; and he had to make use of a language whose strength had not yet been developed. Plato had not enriched it with his magnificent and gorgeous diction, and proved its wondrous flexibility. Herodotus had indeed preceded; but for his lively and garrulous gossip, a far meaner language would have sufficed. Another difficulty is occasioned by the fondness which Thucydides displays for antithesis. We hardly know any writer in whom so many instances of false antithesis are to be found. This is a species of bad taste which is very likely to mislead the reader, who sees words put into apparent opposition between which there is no real repugnancy. The point and brilliancy which such a mode of writing seems to confer, is like the golden apple of Hippolyte, and too often tempts the writer from his course. Few can handle it with success. Perhaps Junius is the best example of the power with which it can invest language. In Thucydides, however, it is frequently a mere jingle of words, or interchange of expressions, which, though opposed in form, are the same in substance. Again, he is frequently very negligent of construction; and, while we are upon this subject, we may take the opportunity of protesting against the spirit which actuates so many of the commentators, especially the German. They appear to study the Greek language with the conviction, that every ancient writer observed rigidly and unerringly the rules of composition. They cannot fancy such a thing as an error in idiom; and unless every passage appears in the manuscripts from which the text is taken, framed according to critical square and rule, they assume that there has been some error on the part of the copyist, and exhaust their invention in devising emendations. But why should we not suppose, that in many cases the ancients themselves violated the rules of strict grammar, as we know is the case with some of our best writers? Why should we fetter them so tightly in the chains which we have ourselves forged out of their own

* Thuc. i. 20.

remains? We are not now speaking of passages, where, in the original state, the meaning cannot be made out. Such are a fair field for critical sagacity. It is evident that the writer did not wish to be unintelligible; and therefore we are bound to suppose that there has been some corruption of the text, and in this case conjectural emendations are not only legitimate but necessary. But we confess we have no eye which is grievously offended at an awkward construction when the sense is clear, and would in general much rather admit that the passage was originally faulty, than place it upon the Procrustean bed of a commentator, to be cut and pared until it suited his fastidious taste.

Now, Thucydides abounds in anacolutha. He begins a paragraph weighty in sense and argument, and frequently forgets at the end of it what construction he had used. The hypothesis of his sentence sometimes wants an apodosis. It seems as though his words were overcharged with matter, and, while struggling to convey his meaning, were unable to confine themselves within the laws of grammatical propriety. That these are faults must be at once conceded; but when we admit them to be so, much of the apparent difficulty vanishes. Instead of wasting our time in a fruitless attempt to reconcile solecisms with the received canons of grammar, we should look upon them as instances where the writer has been careless in his use of language, and proceed at once to an attentive consideration of his meaning. These faults, in the style of Thucydides, occur principally in his speeches; and of these the young student ought to be made aware. His narrative is, in general, clear and unembarrassed. It is only when the historian assumes the tone of the philosopher that he becomes obscure; and this obscurity is not so much real as apparent. A little familiarity with his idiom suffices to make the sense plain, except in a few passages which have cruelly tormented the ingenuity of commentators. But we must repeat what we have before urged, that no one can hope to appreciate and enjoy the lessons of political wisdom which are scattered so largely throughout this inestimable history — no one is competent to derive ¹²² his full share of the instruction which was there intended for posterity, who has not taken the pains to make himself a sound and accurate scholar. It was a sense of this which dictated the words of the epitaph in which Thucydides is made to say —

Εἰμι γὰρ οὐ παντέσσι βίος —

one great advantage to be gained from an attentive study of these speeches is this. We shall then see the kind of arguments which swayed the minds of the Grecian multitudes. We shall know the motives

displayed which resulted in actions of which the massacre at Mytilene and the defeat at Syracuse were part. We shall learn a salutary lesson, speaking trumpet-tongued, of the evils of democratic power. We shall gain an insight into the characters of the leading men of those times, and know something of the contexture of their minds from the counsels they recommended. We shall be taught to appreciate the worth of such creeping reptiles as Cleon — men who live by popular excitement whose trade is "agitation," whose element is confusion — and who array the passions of the multitude against the good and great men whom posterity will delight to honour. We shall find in these orations the most valuable commentary upon the excellences and defects of the Grecian republics, and be better able to understand their social economy. We have in them the deliberate opinions of a profound thinker and careful observer upon contemporary events during the most interesting period of Grecian history — and these ought to be studied with attention by the practical statesman, and not left to the ignorance of the schoolboy, or the syllabic accuracy of the academician preparing for his degree.

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WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, EDINBURGH
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Christ Church, Oxford, 10 Oct. 1988

Sir

I have read with great pleasure Professor H.D.Jocelyn's learned review-article to Professor C.O.Brink's *English Classical Scholarship (Philology and Education)* (Liverpool Classical Papers No1.). Generous though Professor Jocelyn has been in giving us thirty-two pages, I would like more.

For example, Professor Jocelyn speaks of 'the fact that while Jowett was succeeded in the Regius Chair of Greek at Oxford by Ingram Bywater, the good scholar who did not aspire to be an indifferent man of letters, Bywater's successors have all felt a need to conduct themselves more in the manner of Jowett'. I have known all three of these men, and am puzzled as to how their conduct resembles that of Jowett. I imagine that two of them resemble Jowett in having written some things meant not only for scholars, but for a wider public; but am curious to know in what way the conduct of Jowett resembles that of E.R.Dodds.

According to Professor Jocelyn, 'Housman knew Greek more widely and more profoundly than any man in England between 1887 and 1936'. I should be grateful if he would show us how he knows that Housman knew Greek better than, say, Edgar Lobel (born in 1888).

Professor Jocelyn applauds 'the book's redimensioning' of the person to whom he refers, in a style resembling that often found in those public prints in which he thinks no true scholar ought to write, as 'the egregious Jebb'. 'Jebb had more limitations', I wrote in the *Classical Review* for 1969, 'than his English contemporaries realised; he fatally accepted the metrical theories of J.H.H. Schmidt, he lacked the gift of divination, he was often too ready to gloss over difficulties. Yet again and again, without heat and with the most elegant concision, he set aside conjectures offered by the most brilliant of his immediate predecessors, by Schneidewin or Bergk or Nauck, which might have value in that they indicated a difficulty, but which did not deserve to be adopted in the text'. In the same Journal for 1978 I wrote of Jebb: 'His commentary is not only a work of learning, but a literary study, which only a man of taste and a skilled writer of English could have produced'.

I shall be grateful if the two eminent Latinists will explain to me why I am wrong to admire Jebb, of whose 'exceptionally fine feeling for Greek' J.D.Denniston, in my opinion no mean judge, speaks in the preface to *The Greek Particle*. It is interesting to see how much of Housman's wit, elegance and concision they have acquired by their long study of his works.

I am, Sir, yours,

Hugh Lloyd-Jones

Professor P.H.J. Lloyd-Jones

To the Editor, LCM

Corrigenda

Despite the best efforts of the EA, the Editor continues to introduce not only literals but also errors into LCM, and for them he offers the most abject apologies to the unfortunate authors who have suffered from them. First and most importantly to C.S.Steppler (Jun., 91-94) whose name appeared correctly in the copyright notice but wrongly everywhere else. And to T.E. Kinsey (May, 80) who was given what he charitably interpreted as a digamma. And to Sarah Donaldson, who is a graduate student not at St Andrews but at Durham, and in whose article, p.100 line 4, the word *dirae* should have been printed as *DIRAE*. And to C.A.Stray (Jun.85-90), in whose article, at p.86, line 1 of 3rd complete para. 'J.' should be deleted before 'Kennedy', at p.88, 3rd line from the bottom, read 'It is this expanding market for respectable, rather than critical scholarship which . . .', p.89, last full para., in the parenthesis in line 6, insert 'art' before 'history'. And finally to Dana Ferris Sutton (Jul., 105-8), at the end of the 4th line of the first quoted passage, after 'that' insert 'of the': in the 3rd line from the bottom of that page 'coal-scuttle' should be read for the Editor's 'charcoal basket' and the same word inserted with 'and' before 'the chopping block' in the penultimate line of the first full para. of p.106, with 'props' for 'a prop'. In the 3rd line of the last full para. of that page there should be a semi-colon after 'retained' and a comma after *πρωχός ὦν*, and in the last full line of n.2 'by' inserted before 'Euripides'. The Editor is learning by bitter experience and the reproofs of others that speed is the enemy of accuracy, for which there is no substitute.